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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991,' the plaintiff in an employment
discrimination case who alleges intentional discrimination may recover
punitive damages' if she demonstrates that her employer engaged in the
discriminatory practice with "malice" or "reckless indifference" to
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scatttered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C. § la-5 (Supp. V 1993), 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp. V 1993), and
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993) provides:
(a) Right of recovery
(1) Civil rights
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an
employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited
under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e16], and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1981
of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive
damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief
authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the
respondent.
Id. The provision for compensatory and punitive damages also applies to actions under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. V 1993), and to actions
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1988). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2)
(Supp. V 1993). The damages, however, are capped as follows:
(3) Limitations
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section
for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount
of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each
complaining party(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
$300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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federally protected rights.3 To prove a case of disparate treatment under
Title VII,4 the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact
that her employer intended to discriminate against her.5 In other words,
to be liable in a disparate treatment case, the employer has to
specifically intend to treat the plaintiff differently based, for example,
on her sex.6 If the defendant is found liable in such a case, the plaintiff
may recover punitive damages by showing recklessness or malice on the
part of the defendant.7 Recklessness requires a less culpable state of
mind than specific intent to discriminate,' and malice includes both
recklessness and specific intent.9
The standard that Congress intended to set for the imposition of
punitive damages is not immediately obvious. Looking at the plain
language of the statute, Congress seems to have set either the same, or
a lower standard for the imposition of punitive damages than for
liability, since proof of intent to discriminate necessarily includes
malice'0 and certainly includes recklessness." This article posits that
setting the same, or a lower standard for punitive damages than for
liability is a flaw in the 1991 Act. This flaw has been carried over from

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(I) (Supp. V 1993). That section provides:
(b) Compensatory and punitive damages
(1) Determination of punitive damages
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or political
subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged
in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual.
Id.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
5. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (summarizing Title VII
"disparate treatment" proof paradigm); Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending
Contradictions:Richard Posner'sPragmatismand PregnancyDiscrimination,46 FLA. L. REv.
193, 223-25 (1995) (also summarizing a Title VII plaintiffs burden under "disparate treatment"
analysis).
6. See Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proofin DiscriminationCases: Toward
a Theory of ProceduralJustice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1227 (1981).
7. See supra note 3.
8. Compare infra text accompanying notes 84-86 with infra note 101.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
10. See infra note 103.
11. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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analogous law under sections 19812 and 1983's and already has
caused problems for the courts under Title VII as it has under sections
1981 and 1983.14
The article proposes a new standard for punitive damages under Title
VII: punitive damages should be presumptively appropriate in all cases
in which the defendant has intentionally discriminated. To avoid the
imposition of punitive damages, the defendant should bear the burden
of persuasion to show that she acted reasonably and in good faith. This
standard comports with related law, is more analytically sound, and will
lead to more uniform results than the standards the courts presently use.
This article examines the meanings of "intent to discriminate,"
"malice," and "reckless indifference" in analogous areas of law to
suggest the approach stated above to the problem of defining a rational
standard for punitive damages under Title VII. Section II of the article
examines the theories of discrimination and burdens of proof under Title
VII, as well as the background, passage, and provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Section III discusses the states of mind required by
Title VII and its amendments and then relates these to the states of mind
required in analogous and related areas of law. Criminal law is used as
an analogous area of law to construct a model, and the related areas of
law discussed are sections 1981 and 1983 and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. 5 Section IV proposes the standard for punitive
damages under Title VII, and section V concludes.
II. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The Supreme Court has developed two theories of discrimination
under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact.'6 As the
Court said in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 7 disparate treatment is easier to understand and occurs when
the employer intentionally discriminates against an employee based on

12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
14. See infra part III.C.
15. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
16. See Belton, supra note 6, at 1226-28. But see David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 (1993) (asserting that there are two primary
theories of employment discrimination under Title VII and a third theory analogous to the
doctrine of negligence); Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination:
Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 800 (1985) (stating that 'Title VII has spawned two
models of discrimination, but only one theory").
17. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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his race, sex, religion, color, or national origin." In contrast, the
disparate impact theory, first explained by the Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,19 applies to employment criteria which have a disparate
impact on a protected class, because the use of such criteria eliminates
more persons of that class than others.2" The Court explained in Griggs
of intent to discriminate is unnecessary in a disparate impact
that proof
21
case.

18. Id. at 335 n.15.
19. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
20. See Willborn, supra note 16, at 800.
21. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The main method of proof in disparate impact cases is
statistical. Accord Jeffrey D. Horst, Note, The Application of Title VII to Law Firm Partnership
Decision: Women Struggle to Join the Club, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 841, 878 n.294 (1983) (noting that
statistical proof also may be used in disparate treatment cases). The plaintiff presents statistics
to show that an employment criterion screens out, for example, significantly more blacks than
whites. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 983 (1988). "The evidence
in these 'disparate impact' cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific
incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities." Id. at 987. Once the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the practice by proving
that business necessity justified the criterion. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. See generally
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 81-89 (1972) (discussing the scope of the
business necessity defense in disparate impact cases); Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions
of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line
Principle,31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983) (discussing techniques for avoiding Title VII liability).
Professor Brodin opines that the disparate impact theory makes the employer strictly
liable for this form of discrimination. Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Faultand Motive in Defining
Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943, 957 (1984).
Because the employer has a defense, I am not sure I agree. Under the criminal law, which I am
using as a model in this article, if the defendant does the proscribed act or brings about the
proscribed result, he is guilty if the crime is a strict liability offense. WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUsTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 242 (2d ed. 1986). If he can interpose a defense, then
the crime is not a strict liability crime. See id. (stating that any absence of fault defense is
irrelevant in true strict liability cases).
It may even be that disparate impact is more akin to criminal negligence or recklessness
in some cases. When the employer applies a criterion that he knows or should know will screen
out more women than men but does not impose the criterion for that reason, but instead for a
business reason, he does not intend to discriminate. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979). If the business reason is obviously insufficient, it can be argued that the
defendant was criminally negligent or reckless, depending on the nature of the reason and the
likelihood of the discrimination. For example, in Feeney, Massachusetts gave veterans preference
for civil service positions. See id. at 259. The preference operated overwhelmingly in favor of
males. Id. Although the Court said the policy was not intentionally discriminatory, see id. at 279,
it surely would have to be considered reckless at least: the -defendant, the legislature of
Massachusetts, must have been subjectively aware of a high degree of risk that more women
than men would be screened out. See id. at 278. The Court said that to be intentionally
discriminatory, the criterion would have to be chosen "because of" its discriminatory effect and
"not merely 'in spite of' " those effects. Id. at 279.
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In the early days of Title VII, when courts interpreted its provisions
broadly,22 the Act appeared likely to achieve its goal of equal
employment opportunity. As time passed and the courts became more
conservative generally and perhaps disenchanted with Title VII and the
amount of time they were spending on it, interpretations of the Act
became more restrictive.23 Because of these restrictive interpretations,
plaintiffs had difficulty proving violations.2
Even when plaintiffs succeeded in proving a violation, the remedies
provided in Title VII were inadequate. Prior to the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, only equitable remedies, such as reinstatement with backpay,
were allowed for Title VII violations. 6 The plaintiff had to mitigate
backpay 7 and rarely desired reinstatement, so the remedies were fairly
negligible.28 Consequently, plaintiffs did not have a sufficient incentive
to enforce their rights.29 Following the Court's decision in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio,30 employers' incentive to refrain from
discriminatory acts was weakened even further.3" Finally, since the
remedies were equitable, the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial32

22. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 757-70 (1976) (holding that
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) did not bar an award of seniority status which would have been enjoyed
but for the illegal discriminatory refusal to hire and that the award was appropriate under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)); Griggs, 411 U.S. at 429-30, 432 (deciding that Title VII could be violated
without proof of discriminatory intent); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and
the Continued Dominance of the DisparateTreatment Conception of Equality, 11 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1992) (stating that federal judges reversed course in 1977 after giving Title
VII claims a "generous early reception").
23. See Judith J. Johnson, Rebuilding the Barriers: The Trend in Employment
Discrimination Class Actions, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 54-58 (1987); Lewis, supra
note 22, at 2.
24. See Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 971 & n.327.
25. See Caryn L. Lilling, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Examination of the Storm
Preceding the Compromise of America's Civil Rights, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 215, 250-52
(discussing pre-1991 remedies).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). However, Title VII did provide for attorney's fees.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) ("[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
backpay otherwise allowable").
28. See Lilling, supra note 25, at 251-52 (pointing out inadequacies of pre-1991 remedies).
29. See id. at 251.
30. 440 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding, among other things, that the plaintiff is required to
identify the criterion causing the disparate impact and that the plaintiff must bear the burden of
persuasion throughout a disparate impact case).
31. Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 934-35.
32. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975), superseded by 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. V 1993).
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but rather appeared before a (sometimes jaded) district judge.33
Another consideration served as an impetus for change, especially in
the remedial provisions of Title VII: while plaintiffs alleging national
origin or racial discrimination could sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well
as Title VII,3 4 and recover compensatory and punitive damages,
plaintiffs alleging sex and religious discrimination were limited to
equitable relief allowed by Title VII" Proponents of the equalization
of remedies in Title VII and section 1981 cases also pointed out that
often the plaintiff suffers no loss of pay or position in a sexual
harassment case.36 Consequently, the plaintiff would be afforded no
real relief even if she prevailed.
After Wards Cove, in which the Supreme Court rendered a decision
significantly limiting the disparate impact model, 7 Congress began
working to overturn that ruling, as well as others.38 Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which changed the remedial provisions of
Title VII, among other things.39 The President vetoed the legislation,
and Congress failed to override the veto by one vote.' The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, a somewhat weakened version of the Civil Rights
Act of 1990, became law the next year.4' One section of the 1991 Act
33. This was my experience as counsel for management in employment discrimination
cases for several years.
34. See infra text accompanying note 121.
35. See David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil RightsAct of 1991, 8 LAB. LAW.
849, 857 (1992).
36. See id.
37. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61; Oppenheimer, supra note 16, at 934-35
(discussing Wards Cove and its demise by statute).
38. Some other significant rulings Congress sought to overturn included EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236 (1991) (holding that Title VII does not apply to United
States citizens working for American companies out of the United States); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1989) (holding that because § 1981 applies only to the
formation and enforcement of contracts, and not to the breach of their terms, discrimination in
hiring, for example, is actionable under § 1981, but racial harassment relating to conditions of
employment is not); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989) (holding that
the statute of limitations for attacking a facially neutral and neutrally applied seniority system
begins to run when the system is adopted); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 759-61 (1989)
(allowing persons who could have intervened before the final approval of consent decrees
providing goals for promotion of blacks and setting forth an extensive remedial scheme to attack
the decrees later); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (holding that an
employer who takes gender into account in making an employment decision shall not be liable
if it proves that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken gender into
account). For other cases some members of Congress wanted to overturn or modify, see Lilling,
supra note 25, at 217 n.18.
39. See Lilling, supra note 25, at 216-17.
40. See id. at 216.
41. See supra note 1.
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changed the remedial provisions of Title VII, allowing plaintiffs who
proved intentional discrimination to recover compensatory and punitive
damages.42
The 1991 Act provides in section 1981a that the plaintiff may
recover compensatory and punitive damages in addition to any relief
allowed by Title VII. 43 In order to recover punitive damages, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant "engaged in a
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual."' This article focuses on the meaning of these italicized
terms, which neither the Act nor the legislative history defines.
III.

STATES OF MIND REQUIRED

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allows the imposition of punitive
damages only in cases of intentional discrimination and specifically
excludes disparate impact cases from the provision. 4' This part of the
article begins by considering the general meanings of the words of intent
now embodied in Title VII by statute or interpretation: "intent to
discriminate," "malice," and "reckless indifference."
"Intent to discriminate" has a fairly settled meaning under Title
VII.46

Because, Congress passed the amendments to Title VII only

recently, however, the courts have not had much experience to date in
interpreting "malice" and "reckless indifference," the words of intent
contained in the punitive damages provision.4 ' Although there is some
Title VII caselaw on the subject which this article examines, for the
most part the meanings of "malice" and "reckless indifference" must be
divined with reference to analogous and related areas of law.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
43. Id. This relief is available in an action alleging intentional discrimination, but not in
actions alleging disparate impact discrimination. Id. The section further stipulates that the
plaintiff may recover compensatory and punitive damages provided that he cannot recover under
42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. For text of the section, see supra note 2. It is not clear whether Congress
meant to prohibit double damages to a plaintiff in a race or national origin discrimination case
who brings a claim under both Title VII and § 1981, or whether damages are only recoverable
in situations in which the plaintiff has no cause of action under § 1981, such as in sex or
religious discrimination cases. Under the latter interpretation, the plaintiff must sue under § 1981
to recover damages in a race or national origin discrimination case. Cathcart & Snyderman,
supra note 35, at 858. Another possibility is that the plaintiff must elect to proceed under either
§ 1981 or Title VII if he has a cause of action under both. See id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added); supra note 3.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993); supra note 3.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993); supra note 3.
48. See infra notes 176-208 and accompanying text (standards under Title VII caselaw).
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The operative state of mind for disparate treatment, which is intent
to discriminate, is the same as an intentional or purposeful state of mind
under the criminal law.49 "Recklessness" and "malice" also have
relatively settled meanings under the criminal law, making it an
authoritative source for interpreting words of intent. The criminal law,
then, is an appropriate analytical framework for this discussion.
Section 1981 affords another remedy for private racial and ethnic
discrimination." Along with the amendment to Title VII providing for
compensatory and punitive damages, Congress stipulated that this
recovery was only available if the plaintiff could not recover under
section 1981.51 Congress surely, then, intended that the standards under
both laws be construed consistently. The standard f r punitive damages
under section 1981, therefore, is the most analogous law to use as a
source to interpret the meaning of the provision for punitive damages
under Title VII 2

49. See infra notes 84-87. Employment discrimination may be classified as a tort, see, e.g.,
Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520, 528 (5th Cir. 1980), and the meaning
ascribed to "intent to discriminate" in Title VII cases corresponds with the state of mind required
for intentional torts. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1963) (using "intent"
to denote that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it) and W. PAGE KEETON El AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that the three most basic
elements of the common usage of "intent" by courts are (1) that it is a state of mind, (2) about
consequences of an act (or omission), which (3) encompasses both having in mind a purpose to
bring about given consequences and having in mind a belief that given consequences are
substantially certain to resvlt from the act) with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1993). 1
prefer, however, to use the criminal law model. There is some confusion in the courts in this
regard, as there is with the standard for punitive damages and the definition of malice in torts.
See, e.g., infranote 129 and accompanying text (discussing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)).
All of the words of intent under Title VII have better analogies under the criminal law, which
is the original source of law for the idea that one should be liable based on subjective intent. See
infra text accompanying notes 88-105.
50. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Cathcart &
Snyderman, supra note 35, at 880-81. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. V 1993) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 116-74.

530
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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 3 is also a
useful reference because the discrimination provisions of the ADEA
were taken word for word from Title VII.5 4 The ADEA provides for
liquidated damages for a willful violation." The liquidated damages
provision in the ADEA is similar in purpose to the punitive damages
provision in Title VII; both are designed to punish an employer who has
discriminated. 6
The first question to resolve at this point is what the courts mean by
intent to discriminate under Title VII. The starting point for this issue
is a description of the proof of intent to discriminate.
A. Title VII
1. Proving Intent to Discriminate
The defendant is liable for intentional discrimination under Title VII
when she intentionally treats one person differently from another
because of that person's race, sex, religion, color, or national origin.5
Caselaw provides four ways to prove disparate treatment. The first
involves circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment for which the
Supreme Court constructed a model of proof in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.58 The plaintiff must show (1) that he is a member of
a protected class; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a position for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that the employer continued to
seek applicants having the same qualifications as the plaintiff.59 In
order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, then, the

53. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
54. See, e.g., Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972)
("With a few minor exceptions the prohibitions of this enactment are in terms identical to those
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 except that 'age' has been substituted for 'race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' " (footnote omitted)); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
584 (1978) ("[Ihe prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VIL.").
55. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
56. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985) ("The legislative
history of the ADEA indicates that Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in
nature.")
57. See Michael J. Zimmer & Charles A. Sullivan, The Structure of Title VII Individual
Disparate Treatment Litigation: Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of
Discrimination, and Burdens of Proof, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 26 (1986). For a good
discussion of burdens of proof in both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, see
Belton, supra note 5, at 1235-50.
58. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
59. Id. at 802. The Court noted that this exact formulation of a prima facie case may not
be applicable to a case involving different facts. Id. at 802 n.13.
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plaintiff must eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory causes for
rejection, such as lack of qualifications and unavailability of a
position.' Only then will the court require the employer to "articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for rejecting the plaintiff.6 '
The Court later clarified that the employer must produce evidence of
a reason for rejecting the plaintiff62 but need not persuade the court that
she was motivated by that particular reason.63 The Court said that the
plaintiffs initial burden was not onerous and that the burden of
persuasion remained on the plaintiff at all times.' Once the employer
produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff
bears the burden of persuading the court that the reason given by the
employer was not the true reason for the employer's action but rather
was a pretext for discrimination.65
A second model of proof of intentional discrimination is necessary
when the plaintiff has direct evidence of intentional discrimination. The

60. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
61. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
62. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
63. Id. at 254.
64. Id. at 253.
65. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 4142. At one time the lower courts held that a plaintiff who established that a defendant's
proffered reasons were pretextual was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Melissa A.
Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court Muddies the
Evidentiary Waters in CircumstantialDiscriminationCases, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 385, 403 (1994).
The courts assumed that, if the employer lied about the reason, the employer must have
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. See id.
The Supreme Court recently reinterpreted its decisions with regard to this issue in St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). In that case, the Court said that the trier of fact
may resolve the ultimate issue of discrimination vel non based on its disbelief of the employer's
reasons for its action, but that such disbelief does not necessarily satisfy the plaintiff's ultimate
burden of proving discrimination. Id. at 2749. The plaintiff must prove not only that the
employer's reasons were untrue but also that discrimination was the real reason for the
employer's action. Id. at 2752. The Court apparently recognized the unfortunate reality that
employers may lie about the grounds for their decisions for a variety of reasons, some of which
are not discriminatory. See id. at 2754. I concede that an employer may lie because his real
reason is ludicrous or arbitrary but not actually discriminatory. The proper step at this point,
however, is to put the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove the real reason, rather than
adding an additional, and in many cases, impossible burden on the employee. Given St. Mary's
Center, however, if the employee has to show more than that the employer lied, it is even more
obvious that the employer who lies and is adjudged to have intentionally discriminated should
be punished with punitive damages.
Since my proposed solution requires the defendant to prove good faith to avoid punitive
damages, see infra text accompanying notes 227-78, it should be noted here that it would be
unlikely that a defendant could interpose a defense of good faith in a pretext case.
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McDonnell Douglas test is not appropriate in situations in which the
plaintiff has direct proof of discrimination.66 In such a case, if the
plaintiffs evidence is credible the burden of persuasion shifts to the
employer to prove that the employer would have made the same
decision even absent the discriminatory factor.67
The third type of intentional discrimination case is characterized by
mixed motives 6' and is exemplified by the case of Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins. 69 In that case, the plaintiff proved that the defendant had
considered her gender in its decision to deny her partnership.7" Because
the plaintiffs poor interpersonal skills also entered into the defendant's
decision," the Supreme Court analyzed the case as an instance of
mixed motives.7 2 A four-Justice plurality of the Court, while affirming
that an employer who acts on the basis of sex stereotyping has acted on
the basis of gender,73 voted to remand the case to allow the employer
to avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision
based on permissible factors alone.74
Prior to the 1991 Act, the employer could avoid liability in mixed
motive cases by proving that she would have made the same decision
for exclusively legitimate reasons, even though the plaintiff's protected
status played a "motivating part" in the employment decision. 5 This
part of the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse was one

66. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121; Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774
(11 th Cir. 1982). Thurston was an age discrimination case, but the Court noted that Title ViI
principles were applicable. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121.
67. E.g., Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 841 F.2d 1533, 1539, modified
on other grounds, 848 F.2d 1522 (11 th Cir. 1988); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d
1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
68. A "mixed motive" case involved a defendant who was motivated by both lawful and
unlawful considerations. Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title
VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 293 (1982).
69. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
70. Id. at 235 (plurality opinion). Several partners made comments to the effect that the
plaintiff, a woman, was too masculine. See id. (plurality opinion).
71. See id. at 236 (plurality opinion).
72. See id. at 232-58 (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 250 (plurality opinion).
74. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion). The plurality directed the lower court to use a
preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard
previously used by the lower courts. Id. at 252-53, 258 (plurality opinion). On remand, the
defendant was unable to prove it would have made the same decision without considering the
plaintiff's gender. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (D.D.C.), affid, 920
F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
75. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion). The prohibited factor plays
a motivating part in the employment decision when, for instance, the plaintiff's gender was one
of the potentially many reasons for the decision. See id. at 250 (plurality opinion).
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impetus for the 1991 Civil Rights Act.76 Now, if the employee can
simply show that his protected status was a motivating factor in the
employer's decision, the employer has violated Title VII 77 Although
the employer may no longer avoid liability by showing that she would
have made the same decision without considering the prohibited factor,
such a showing may allow the employer to avoid damages and certain
equitable relief.78
A case in which intentional discrimination is a pattern or practice79
requires a fourth type of proof."0 In this case, the plaintiff must prove
widespread discrimination, usually by using statistics and testimony
regarding specific instances of discriminatory treatment.8 Even if the
court finds a pattern or practice of discrimination, it can deny relief to
individual class members against whom the defendant can prove it did
not discriminate. 2 The object in all of these types of cases is to decide
76. See Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 35, at 849.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). This section provides:
(in) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in

employment practices.
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
Id. Some commentators have noted that this provision may make affirmative action plans illegal
altogether. See Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 35, at 876-80.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). That section provides:
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the
court(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in
clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title;
and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
Id. For a good discussion of causation in this regard, see Brodin, supra note 68.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1988). The plaintiff in a private sector pattern or practice case
is the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1988); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 360 (1977). In pattern or practice suits against state or local governments, the plaintiff
is the Attorney General. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 note (1988).
80. See InternationalBhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357-62.
81. See, e.g., id. at 336-39.
82. See id. at 362.
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whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff or
plaintiffs; that is, whether she intentionally treated them differently
because of their race, sex, religion, color, or national origin."
2. Intent to Discriminate Under Title VII
The meaning of intentional discrimination under the Constitution and
under Title VII is generally the same.84 The "intent to discriminate"
requirement of Title VII is akin to the purposeful or intentional state of
mind in criminal law.85 If the defendant intends to do the act that
brings about the statutorily proscribed result, for example, he intends to
treat people of different races differently because of their race, then the

83. This article proposes the creation of another layer of proof, so that if the defendant
intentionally discriminated, then he must also prove that he acted in reasonable good faith to
avoid the imposition of punitive damages. See infra text accompanying notes 227-82.
84. Eric Schnapper, Two Categoriesof DiscriminatoryIntent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
31, 57 (1982); cf. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746 n.l (1993) (treating
purposeful discrimination the same for § 1983 and Title VII claims). Contra D. Don Welch,
Removing DiscriminatoryBarriers:BasingDisparateTreatmentAnalysis on Motive Rather Than
Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 759-62 (1987) (arguing that Title VII is designed to go further
than the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1981). As Professor Brodin has articulated, intent to
discriminate under the Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988) may differ from
intent as it is construed in the tort area. See Brodin, supra note 21, at 975.
The notion of intent as "motive" and "purpose" represents a rejection of the
traditional view of intent that prevails in the tort area, in which the term generally
is defined without regard to the actor's motive or underlying purpose, but is used
merely to distinguish conduct that is deliberate and volitional from conduct that is
accidental.... [T]ort intent encompasses not only those consequences that the
actor actually desired, but also those which a reasonable person would believe are
substantially certain to follow from the act. Thus tort law has objectified the
requisite state of mind for its intentional wrongs, permitting it to be inferred from
the circumstances of the act and thus avoiding the subjective question of actual
state of mind.
Id. at 978-79 (footnotes omitted).
The Restatement view and Prosser state that the intent required for intentional torts is not
objective but subjective. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1963); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 49, § 8. There appears, however, to be a problem in defining these states of mind
in torts, and this led to the definitional problems with punitive damages the Supreme Court
encountered in Smith. See infra part 1II.C.1 (discussing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 37-48
(1983)).
Professor Brodin uses the terms "motive" and "purpose" interchangeably to define intent.
Brodin, supra note 21, at 978. I prefer to view intent as purposefulness and motive as the
explanation for defendant's act.
85. See Brodin, supra note 21, at 983 (discussing the intent requirement applied by courts
in litigation challenging seniority systems and seniority-based layoffs brought under Title VII).
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defendant has acted with specific intent comparable to purposefulness
in criminal law.86 Intent to commit murder does not require that the
defendant have a personal antipathy, just that the defendant intend to kill
without justification, excuse or mitigation. 7 Similarly, discrimination
does not require a malevolent motive, just the intent to treat a member
of a protected class differently, because of his membership in the
protected class. On this point, then, examining the best source of words
of intent, the criminal law, will be helpful.
B. Criminal Law
The states of mind relevant to Title VII, "intent to discriminate,"
"malice" and "reckless indifference," have close analogies to significant
states of mind for criminal culpability. The purpose of punitive damages
in an employment discrimination case is to " 'punish a wrongdoer for
his outrageous conduct and to deter others from engaging in similar
conduct.' ," The purpose is penal, therefore, not remedial.8 9
Criminal law is the source of the idea that a person's culpability
should be determined depending on his state of mind with regard to the
criminally proscribed act.' The advantage of interpreting states of
mind with reference to the criminal law is that such states of mind are
susceptible to concrete articulation. This would be useful, because vague
ideas, such as "ill will," obscure the issue of punitive damages and
inhibit uniform imposition of a standard.
As an example, criminal homicide encompasses all of the states of
mind now found in Title VII. The common law definition of murder is
a killing with malice.9 Although malice in the popular sense means
86. Professor Blumrosen posited a model identifying three concepts concerning the nature
of discrimination: one motivated by personal antipathy and requiring an act and harm, which he
correlates with malice or willfull and wanton misconduct; a second which requires that the
defendant treat members of minority groups differently, which comports with negligence in tort
and constitutional equal protection cases; and a third which consists of conduct having an
adverse impact on minority group members. Blumrosen, supra note 21, at 67.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
88. Yarbrough v. Tower Oldsmobile, Inc., 789 F.2d 508, 514 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1314 (7th Cir. 1985)); accord Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983).

§ 2.

89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 49,

90. See Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 989-91 (1932) (comparing
evolution of tort law mens rea to that in criminal law).
91. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 57 (3d ed. 1982). The

trend is away from the using the term "malice aforethought" to define murder. Id. Aforethought
was added "in the ancient cases to indicate a design thought out well in advance of the fatal
act." Id.
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personal ill will, in the criminal sense it has a more particular
meaning.92 It means that the defendant, without excuse, justification, or
recognized mitigation, specifically intended to bring about the criminally
proscribed result, or was extremely reckless with regard to such
result.93 In the context of murder, then, malice means that the
defendant intended to kill, intended to inflict serious bodily injury, or
was acting with a depraved heart, and that the defendant had no excuse,
justification or mitigation.94
The "depraved heart" state of mind has been codified in the
provision on murder in the Model Penal Code as criminal homicide
committed "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life."95 Earlier formulations of the
depraved heart state of mind included " 'wanton and wilful disregard of
an unreasonable human risk,' "96 and stated in a more poetic but less
concrete fashion," 'wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty.' ""
The vague idea of ill will, which has obscured the idea of malice,
may have originated in the criminal law;98 but the version of malice
recognized in more enlightened analyses of the criminal law
substantially rectifies this lapse in rigor. It is the criminal law that
should serve as a model for a discussion of the term "malice" in Title
VII. Malice should mean specific intent to bring about the proscribed
result or extremely reckless disregard of the result.99 Malice, then, in
Title VII cases, should comprehend the intent to discriminate, as well
as the extremely
reckless disregard of bringing about the
discrimination."°

92. Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 537
(1934).
93. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 91, at 856-61.
94. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 21, at 605; Perkins, supra note 92, at 552, 555-57.
"Homicide is justifiable if it is either commanded or authorized by law .... Homicide which
is neither commanded nor authorized by law is excusable if committed under circumstances not
involving criminal guilt." PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 91, at 56. Mitigation is some other
circumstance, such as the unreasonable belief self-defense or the provocation defense. See id.
at 102-03 & n.91. Either negates malice. Id.
95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1980).
96. Id. § 210.2 cmt. 1 (1980) (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 36 (2d ed.
1969)).
97. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445, 447 (Pa. 1946) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868))).
98. LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra note 21, at 605.
99. The defendant also must be acting without excuse, justification or mitigation. See
supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
100. Intent to inflict serious bodily harm does not have a counterpart here, as is usual with
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There is a difference, however, between acting with mere
recklessness l .. and with a depraved heart."° The recklessness
necessary for murder is such a high degree of recklessness that it
evinces an extreme indifference to the value of human life.0 3 Malice
with reference to punitive damages under Title VII also should
comprehend a high degree of recklessness which indicates indifference
to bringing about the statutorily proscribed result, the discrimination, as
well as the specific intent to discriminate. This would seem to be
unnecessary, however, because the statute itself allows mere recklessness
with regard to the proscribed result to be a sufficiently bad state of mind
for the imposition of punitive damages."° Indeed, the defendant
satisfies the standard for punitive damages if he is merely reckless, even
though recklessness is an insufficiently culpable state of mind for
liability under Title VII, which requires purposeful intent to
discriminate."
Recklessness in criminal law is the subjective awareness of a high
degree of risk that the criminally proscribed result will occur."°
Applying this standard to the discrimination context, a defendant would
be acting recklessly if he was subjectively aware of a high degree of
risk that if he did the act he intended, he would be discriminating. While
this would be insufficient for intentional discrimination, the clear
meaning of the 1991 Act would allow the imposition of punitive
damages upon such a showing of recklessness. This comports with
Smith v. Wade,"° discussed below,0 8 in which the Supreme Court
other situations involving malice, other than murder. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 91, at
856-61.
101. Under the better view, recklessness is a conscious awareness of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of bringing about the proscribed result.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's

situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
102. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 21, at 617-18.
103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1980). It should be noted that the Model Penal Code
does not use the term malice, as such, although the concepts are essentially the same.
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
106. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
107. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
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determined that the standard for punitive damages in section 1983 cases
can be the same or lower than the standard for liability."° Setting a
standard for punitive damages at a similar or lower level than for
liability, however, has caused problems for the courts in section 1981
and section 1983 cases."'
Sections 1981 and 1983 are part of the Civil Rights Acts enacted
after the Civil War to protect the newly freed slaves."' Section 1983
affords a remedy for intentional discrimination when there is "state
action,"' 112 and section 1981 provides a remedy for private intentional
discrimination.' 1 3 The caselaw which developed under sections 19814
and 1983 applies to employment discrimination as does Title VII.'
Furthermore, since the substantive law of discrimination in Title VII
cases overlaps with discrimination law under sections 1981 and
1983," a discussion of this area is appropriate at this point.
C. The Standardfor Punitive Damages Under
Section 1981 and Section 1983
To reiterate, because the 1991 Act was enacted relatively recently,
the courts could not have had much opportunity to interpret the new
state of mind elements added to Title VII in the punitive damages
provision. Since these states of mind, "malice" and "reckless
indifference," are new to Title VII, many of the courts which have
interpreted Title VII's punitive damages provision have drawn on
analogous law under section 1981 and section 1983.16 These cases are
not generally helpful to the development of a workable standard;" 7
however, the status of the law derived from these cases illustrates the
need to formulate a more focused standard under Title VII for awarding
108. See infra text accompanying notes 125-48.
109. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.
110. See infra part III.C.2.
111. See BARBARA L. SCHLE1 & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
668 (2d ed. 1983).
112. See id. at 678.
113. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
114. See, e.g., Wilson v. Legal Assistance, 669 F.2d 562, 563-64 (8th Cir. 1982) (likening
employment discrimination claims under § 1981 to Title VII); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ.,
616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) (likening § 1983 to § 1981 and Title VII as federal remedies
for employment discrimination by state actors).
115. See, e.g., London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 1981); Wrenn
v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 771 F. Supp. 594, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affid, 962
F.2d I (2d Cir. 1992).
116. See, e.g., Koppman v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 345
(E.D. La. 1992).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 178-208.
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punitive damages.
Section 1981 was enacted after the Civil War as section one of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. " 8 Although "on its face [it] relates primarily
to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts,' ' 9
the Supreme Court has held that it "affords a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race.""12
Furthermore, "Congress noted 'that the remedies available to the
individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the indiv[i]dual's right
to sue under... 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that the two procedures augment
each other and are not mutually exclusive.' ,121
The remedies under Title VII and section 1981 were quite different
before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, since section 1981 has always
allowed the plaintiff to recover compensatory and punitive damages,"
and Title VII only afforded equitable relief." Since section 1981 and
Title VII are often considered together because they provide different
remedies for the same wrong, 24 section 1981 jurisprudence relating to
punitive damages is the most natural source for a standard under Title
VII.
1. Smith v. Wade
The starting point for punitive damages under section 1981 is the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Wade." Although it is a
decision interpreting section 1983,26 the courts generally refer to the
standard announced in Smith as applicable to section 1981 as well.
In Smith, the defendant contended that the proper test for punitive
damages was "actual malicious intent-'ill will, spite, or intent to
injure.' "' The Court recognized that this area of law was in
confusion and noted that the source of confusion was the varying

118. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 111, at 668. It was re-enacted as the Civil Rights
Act of 1870 after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
119. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975).

120. Id. at 460.
121. Id. at 459 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2154) (alteration in original)).
122. Id. at 460.
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
124. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60; supra note 114 and accompanying text.
125. 461 U.S. at 30.
126. See id. at 31.
127. See, e.g., Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1296 (7th Cir.
1987); Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11 th Cir. 1985); Block v. R.H. Macy & Co.,
712 F.2d 1241, 1246 (8th Cir. 1983).
128. Smith, 461 U.S. at 37.
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meanings ascribed to terms such as "malice" and "gross negligence."' 29
In tort law, the Court said, malice was sometimes used to denote
reckless indifference to the rights of others, while in criminal law it was
sometimes used to mean actual ill will, spite, or intent to injure."' The
Court observed that the rule in the majority of jurisdictions was that
punitive damages could be awarded without a showing of actual ill will,
spite, or intent to injure; rather, a showing of recklessness, serious
indifference to or disregard for the rights of others, or even gross
negligence would suffice. 3 ' The Court determined that it would,
therefore, adopt the standard of the common law: "reckless or callous
disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as well as intentional violations of
federal law, should be sufficient to trigger a jury's consideration of the
appropriateness of punitive damages."'32
The defendant argued that the standard for punitive damages should
be higher than the standard for liability in the first place.'33 The Court
responded that a higher standard was unnecessary, noting that the parties
agreed that there was no substantial difference between the showing
required for compensatory damages and that required for punitive
damages.' 34 The Court observed that the difference is not the standard

129. See id. at 39 & n.8.
130. Id. at 39 n.8.
131. See id. at 45-48. The Court also indicated that the same rule prevailed at the time of
the enactment of § 1983. See id. at 45 & n.12. The reason the Smith Court looked to the
common law of torts was because there was little in § 1983's legislative history concerning the
recovery of damages. See id. at 34. The defendant argued that a primary purpose of § 1983 was
to determine future egregious misconduct. Id. at 49. A standard of reckless or callous
indifference, the defendant contended, would not serve a deterrent purpose because people would
not know if they were being reckless or callously indifferent. See id. They would know,
however, if they were acting with actual ill will or intent to injure. See id. The Court responded
by suggesting that those who were not deterred by compensatory damages would not be deterred
by defendant's proposed actual intent standard for punitive damages. See id. at 50. The Court
also noted that it had declined to apply such a standard in both ordinary tort cases and in the
First Amendment context, and it did not see the need to do so in a § 1983 case. See id. at 49-50.
132. Id. at 51.
133. Id. at 38. The Court noted later that the standard for punitive damages is the same or
lower for some torts. See id. at 53.
134. Id. at 51. The defendant was claiming qualified immunity to which the lower court
applied a standard of reckless or callous indifference. See id. at 50-51. This issue was not
appealed, and the Supreme Court did not disapprove the standard. See id. at 51. The Court has
made it clear in other cases that purposeful discrimination is required for initial liability in §
1981 and § 1983 cases. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389
(1982) (analyzing § 1981); cf., e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)
(interpreting equal protection constitutional law); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (interpreting equal protection law under federal
constitution).
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for awarding punitive damages, but rather that punitive damages "are
never awarded as of right, no matter how egregious the defendant's
conduct. 'If the plaintiff proves sufficiently serious misconduct on the
defendant's part, the question whether to award punitive damages is left
to the jury. ... ' "35 The Court explained
that the focus is on the
36
character of the defendant's conduct.
The opinion does not enlighten us, however, as to precisely what
character of conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages. It
indicates only that punitive damages should be awarded" 'to punish [the
defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like
him from similar conduct in the future.' ,,'3' The majority's resolution
of the case is not helpful to the trial judge
preparing to instruct the jury,
38
and it has resulted in much confusion.
The view of Justice Rehnquist's dissent 39 would have led to more
uniform results. His dissent opined that punitive damages under section
1983 should require actual malice,""4 that is, "some degree of bad faith
or improper motive."'' This dissent was based in part on the purpose
of punitive damages, which is to punish: "It is a fundamental principle
of American law that penal consequences generally ought to be imposed
only where there has been some sort of wrongful animus creating the
type of culpability warranting this treatment."' 42
The courts have had great difficulty in applying Smith. After Smith,
the jury may award punitive damages with no additional evidence than
that adduced for liability. 43 The basis for the award must be rooted,
then, in the purposes for punitive damages: punishment and
deterrence.'" The problem is this: How does the judge instruct the
jury? The Court noted that the defendant's conduct should be outrageous
before the jury should be able to assess punitive damages,'45 but it did
135. Smith, 461 U.S. at 52 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 204 (1973)).
136. Id. at 54.
137. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) (alteration in
original)).
138. See infra part III.C.2.
139. See id. at 56-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 86-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent points out that both
Justice Rehnquist and the majority were trying to divine Congress' intent in enacting § 1983 by
referring to the law prevailing at the time. Id. at 92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Since there was
a significant split of authority in that law, it made more sense to Justice O'Connor to interpret
§ 1983 with reference to the policies underlying § 1983. Id. at 93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

143. See id. at 56.
144. E.g., id. at 54.
145. Id.
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not say it had to be more outrageous than intentionally
discriminating. 46
The language of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is somewhat different, but
has essentially the same purport. Smith shunned the term "malice"
because of its vagueness,'47 but both Title VII and section 1983 have
as their minimum standard for punitive damages the reckless disregard
of protected rights. 4 Since the cases under section 1981 interpreting
Smith are the most authoritative sources for the courts to use in
interpreting provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it is appropriate
to consider those cases at this point.
2. Section 1981 Cases After Smith v. Wade
Many courts, although purporting to follow Smith, have been unable
to apply the standard announced in that case to section 1981 cases. They
have instead tended to make the standard for punitive damages higher
than the standard for liability, in direct contravention of the rule
49
announced in Smith. In Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy-Province, Inc.,'
for example, the Sixth Circuit said: "The imposition of punitive damages
in civil rights actions has generally been limited to cases involving
egregious conduct or a showing of willfulness or malice on the part of
the defendant."'" The court decided that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to pass on intentional discrimination vel non, but that there
was no evidence of "malice or reckless or callous indifference of an
egregious character on the part of either defendant."' 5 ' As in the cases
discussed later under the 1991 Act,'52 the courts in many instances
146. See id. at 54-55 ("[S]ociety has an interest in deterring and punishing all intentional
or reckless invasions of the rights of others .... "). In fact, the Court intimated that the
defendant's conduct need not be more outrageous than intentionally discriminating. See id.
147. Id. at 39 & n.8. Congress did use the term "malice," despite the fact that Smith had
rejected this standard and that courts followed Smith in cases involving Title VII's most
analogous provision, § 1981. So it is possible that Congress intended something different.
Because the minimum standard, "reckless indifference," is the same for § 1981 and Title VII,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993), what Congress meant in using the term "malice"
is fairly irrelevant.
148. CompareSmith, 461 U.S. at 56 (announcing "reckless or callous indifference" standard
in § 1983 cases) with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (providing for punitive damages
under Title VII for "reckless indifference to the federally protected rights" of a plaintiff).
149. 816 F.2d 1104 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987).
150. Id. at 1109 (emphasis added) (citing Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.
1983)).
151. Id. The court affirmed the district judge's J.N.O.V. on the jury's award of punitive
damages. Id.
152. See infra notes 179-205 and accompanying text.
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simply cite the standard for punitive damages and make a conclusory
statement that there is insufficient evidence to support a punitive
damages award, without enlightening us with analysis, despite a finding
that the defendant intentionally discriminated.'
The cases which have allowed the award of punitive damages to
stand are more helpful, although again they often set a higher standard,
such as personal ill will, found unnecessary by the Court in Smith."5
In Yarbrough v. Tower Oldsmobile, Inc.,'55 the Seventh Circuit held
that the record disclosed evidence of ill will because the plaintiff, inter
alia, was transferred to an inferior work area by the defendant supervisor
for the stated reason that he did not want a black person in the front of
the shop.1 56 Because the owners of the company refused to remedy the
situation, the court said that the jury could have reasonably inferred that
the owners were callously indifferent to the plaintiffs protected
rights." The court emphasized that this was a "close case for an
award of punitive damages."'5 8
The Eighth Circuit in Block v. R.H. Macy & Co.159 decided that
purposeful discrimination, required to find a violation of section

153. See, e.g., Beauford, 816 F.2d at 1109; Jackson v. McCleod, 748 F. Supp. 831, 836
(S.D. Ala. 1990).
154. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 39 n.8, 51; supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
155. 789 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1986).
156. Id. at 514.
157. Id.
158. Id. In Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied 475 U.S. 1015 (1986), the Sixth Circuit affirmed an award of punitive damages in a case
in which the plaintiff continuously had complained about racial harassment, and the defendant
had failed to rectify the situation. Id. at 1260. Furthermore, one management person had
threatened to hurt the plaintiff economically if he continued to complain. Id. at 1252, 1260. The
court stated that a jury could find malice based on these circumstances. Id. at.1260. It approved
jury instructions stating that punitive damages were appropriate when the defendant acted
wantonly or oppressively, see id., defining wantonness as reckless or callous indifference to the
plaintiff's rights. Id.
In a district court case, the court decided that the defendant had intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff by discharging him because he was black. Marsh v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1186, 1195 (D. Ariz. 1987). The plaintiff was discharged after a
complaint of sexual harassment was lodged against him. See id. The court concluded that the
plaintiff was discharged on account of his race, because the defendant had treated more
favorably white men accused of similar or perhaps more serious sexual misconduct. See id. The
court also decided that punitive damages were appropriate, because the defendant acted with
reckless indifference to the plaintiff's rights. Id. at 1197. The defendant's official neither
reconsidered his decision to discharge the plaintiff, even after being told that the complaints
against the plaintiff were racially motivated, nor did he make any investigation other than
interviewing the complaining woman. Id.
159. 712 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1983).
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1981,"6 and reckless indifference to the rights of the plaintiff could
reasonably be inferred from the same evidence. 16' The defendant's
personnel managers knew that the plaintiffs co-worker was racially
biased, but acceded to her request to discharge the plaintiff without
making any further inquiry. 62 Also, two white employees had engaged
in similar conduct for which the plaintiff was discharged, but they had
not been disciplined. 63 Furthermore, the defendant replaced the
plaintiff with a white person."6
Some courts have been able to apply the standard in accord with
Smith by looking at the purposes for punitive damages. For example, a
district court said that because punitive damages are designed to punish
the defendant for outrageous conduct and to deter such future conduct
by the defendant and others similarly situated, "[a] jury (or other fact160. Id. at 1245 (quoting General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,
391 (1982)).
161. See id. at 1243, 1247-48.
162. Id. at 1247.
163. Id.
164. Id. In another Eighth Circuit case, the court decided that the jury could have found
that the defendant acted recklessly or with callous indifference to the plaintiff's rights by
discharging him after 34 years because of his race by ignoring its policy of basing employment
decisions on seniority. Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 654 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 499 U.S. 914 (1991). The jury also could have concluded that
the defendant acted callously and was recklessly indifferent when the plaintiff's supervisor gave
"evasive, teasing responses" to the plaintiff when he asked whether he was being discharged
because he was white rather than black. Id. After several appeals, the plaintiff lost when the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 1991 Act does not apply retroactively to cases
pending at the time of its enactment. Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc,, 982 F.2d 295, 299 (8th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1642 (1994).
In an Eleventh Circuit case, the court affirmed an award of punitive damages, citing the
Smith standards but basing its decision on the district court's finding that the defendant's actions
were "deliberate and knowing." Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985). In
that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, for racial reasons, consistently appointed less
qualified white persons to positions plaintiff sought. Id. at 1432. On one occasion, the defendant
had pre-selected a white applicant, then set up a sham application procedure. Id. at 1434. On
another occasion, the defendant lowered job requirements that the plaintiff met in order to hire
"three otherwise unqualified whites." Id.
In another Eleventh Circuit case, the court decided that, although the jury had found that all
four of the defendants were responsible for the discrimination against the plaintiff, the record
did not support the conclusion that they all acted with the requisite ill will or callous disregard
of the plaintiff's rights. Walters v. City of Atlanta, 803 F.2d 1135, 1146-47 (11th Cir. 1986).
The plaintiff testified that all of the defendants were courteous to him, but the court said that
"[c]ourteous behavior may mask a cynical disregard of federal rights; such, however, is not the
case here." Id. at 1147. With regard to one of the defendants, the court found the requisite
reckless disregard for the plaintiffs rights in the fact that this defendant had been the one who
refused to hire the plaintiff, because she was concerned about his race. This defendant also
ultimately hired less qualified applicants. Id. at 1147-48.
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finder) must make a discretionary moral judgment that the policies of
punishment and deterrence would be served by an award of punitive
damages."' 65 The problem is, however, that the court cannot instruct
the jury with regard to when those conditions exist.
In another district court case, the court denied punitive damages on
the basis that they would not serve as a deterrent, because the events
that led to the discrimination were unique and not likely to be
repeated.'" In a Fifth Circuit case, the court, without citing Smith, said
that punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant has acted
willfully and with gross disregard for the plaintiffs rights. 67 The court
noted that it had previously characterized the requisite behavior as
malicious and made no further comment about the standard." The
court then directed the district court to evaluate " 'the nature of the
conduct in question, the wisdom of some form of pecuniary punishment,
and the advisability of a deterrent.' "69 In analyzing the case under
this standard, the court recognized that discrimination is an "abhorrent
practice," but "that the company was taking steps to eliminate [it]" and
that the evidence was not clear on whether the defendant acted
"maliciously."' 7
In WuIf v. City of Wichita, 7' the Tenth Circuit provided a better
reasoned distinction between the state of mind necessary to prove
intentional discrimination and the state of mind necessary for an award
of punitive damages. The court said that not every intentional violation
subjects the defendant to punitive damages." The defendant may have
unreasonably thought it was legitimate for him to discharge the plaintiff
for inefficiency;
however, the court said that punitive damages

165. Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co., 621 F. Supp. 244, 287-88 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (citing
Smith, 461 U.S. at 51 and McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1326 (7th Cir. 1984)), overruled
on other grounds by Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln Nat'l Corp., 644 F. Supp. 983, 986 (N.D. Ind.
1986) (holding that, under Indiana state law, an at-will employee could not bring a state claim
for retaliatory discharge "in the context of a Title VII action"). The Moffett court decided that
punitive damages were appropriate where the defendant had condoned the regular harassment
of the plaintiff for being involved in an interracial relationship. Id. at 288.
166. Mister v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 790 F. Supp. 1411, 1424 (S.D. Ill. 1992).
167. Jones v. Western Geophysical Co., 761 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Gore
v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977)).
168. Id. (citing Claibome v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 154 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979)).
169. Id. (quoting Gore, 563 F.2d at 164 (quoting Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429
F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970))).
170. Id.
171. 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989).
172. Id. at 867.
173. Id.
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require an assessment of the defendant's subjective state of mind. 74
A review of these cases indicates that courts which try to distinguish
the standard for punitive damages from the standard for liability are
having a difficult time applying Smith in a rational way. Conversely, the
courts making the distinction based on the purposes of punitive damages
are faring better, but still suffer from a lack of uniformity in result
because the standard for punishment and deterence is left to the
unguided imagination of the jury. As with section 1981 cases after
Smith, the lower court cases under Title VII are not uniform in their
interpretation of the standard for punitive damages.
D. The Present Standardfor Punitive Damages
Under Title VII
The standard required for punitive damages, "malice or reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights,"'75 introduces terms
which were not present in Title VII before the 1991 Act. In addition,
most courts have held that the damages provisions of Title VII do not
apply retroactively,' 76 and the Supreme Court recently agreed. 77 For
these reasons the courts have had little opportunity to examine the
meanings of these words. Some courts, however, have interpreted the
standard for punitive damages under the 1991 Act. These cases indicate
that the courts are in need of guidance in this area.
As with the cases under section 1981 interpreting the Smith
standard, 78 some of the courts addressing the standard have failed
even to refer to the words of the Act or the facts of the case. In
Koppman v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 17 for example, a

district court in Louisiana identified three sources as providing guidance
on the issue of the standard for punitive damages under Title VII.'O
The sources were section 1981, for which the court said the standard is
that the defendant act "willfully and with a 'gross disregard' for the
plaintiff's rights;"'"' the Air Carrier Access Act, in which the court

174. Id. The court in Wulf is on the right track. I would go a step further and require that
the defendant's good faith belief not only be honest but reasonable.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). See supra note 3 for the text of §
198la(b)(1).
176. See, e.g., Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 932 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992).
177. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1508 (1994).
178. See supra notes 148-74 and accompanying text.
179. 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 345 (E.D. La. 1992).
180. See id. at 358.
181. Id. (quoting Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1319 (5th Cir. 1985) (error in
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would require a showing of" 'wanton and malicious conduct;' 9)182 and
general maritime law, which the court said requires " 'callous
indifference' to the [seaman]'s plight."'8 Having articulated the
possible standards, the court dismissed the punitive damages claim,
because defendants, "at the very worst, intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiffs," but had not "engaged in conduct that could be
described as 'callous' or 'malicious.' ""' This particular court had no
appreciation for the fact that intent to discriminate is the most culpable
state of mind and, having found such, the defendant was necessarily
acting maliciously.
In Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 185 the court, responding to the

defendant's motion for a new trial, reiterated its punitive damages jury
instruction, to which neither party had objected. 6 The instruction
stated, without authority, that punitive damages are appropriate when the
act is "maliciously or wantonly done."'87 The court defined malice as
"ill will, or spite, or grudge" toward the plaintiff or the protected
class.' Although the defendant knew or should have known of the
sexual harassment and failed to take remedial action, 89 the court
concluded that there was no showing of ill will, spite, or grudge by the
defendant."l The basis for this conclusion was that the defendant
eventually transferred the plaintiff to a department in which she was
happy and that the plaintiff generally had no problems with any
management person (other, apparently, than the harasser)."' As
evidence that the defendant did not act maliciously toward the protected
class generally, the court noted that the defendant had previously
"disciplined" this supervisor for sexual harassment."

original)).
182. Id. (quoting Shinault v. American Airlines, 936 F.2d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 1991)).
183. Id. (quoting Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622,625-26 (5th Cir. 1981)).
184. Id.
185. 823 F. Supp. 1475 (W.D. Wis. 1993), vacated on othergrounds, 40 F.3d 230 (7th Cir.
1994).
186. Id. at 1479.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1480.
191. See id. at 1479-80.
192. See id. at 1480. The disciplinary action consisted of a written warning that further acts
of harassment would result in termination. See id. at 1478. The court also said that there was
no evidence that the act was wantonly done, which it defined in a jury instruction as "reckless
or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights of one or more persons, including the
injured person." Id. at 1479. The court said that although the defendant should have known of
the hostile working environment, its failure to conduct a more extensive investigation was not
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The most common problem in analyzing these states of mind is that
the courts are not clear on what the states of mind mean. Many courts
simply assume that Congress intended the standard for recovering
punitive damages to require a more culpable state of mind than intent
to discriminate. For example, in a recent case, the Fourth Circuit stated
in dicta that "[w]hile 'intentional discrimination' suffices to recover
compensatory damages, Congress requires a heightened showing of
discriminatory action.., to recover punitive damages."' 93 The courts
in such cases did not attempt to analyze the meanings of the words of
the statute in arriving at their conclusions. 4
In addition to failing to ascribe a clear meaning to the words of the
statute, these courts also fail to explain why the law applies to the facts.
For example, the court in Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc.'95 determined
that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of hostile environment
' Because a reasonable woman might
sexual harassment. 96
have found
the defendants' conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive, the court made
an inference of intentional discrimination by the defendants.'97 Since
the defendants neither offered factual evidence to defeat the prima facie
case nor took prompt and appropriate action to remedy the situation, the
court denied one of the defendants' motions for summary judgment on
the issue of compensatory damages. 9 ' The court, however, then

reckless or callous, but was merely negligent. Id. at 1480.
The court in Dombeck then bolstered its conclusion by quoting from a § 1983 case which
adhered to the Smith standard for punitive damages, id. (quoting Soderbeck v. Burnett County,
752 F.2d 285, 290 (7th Cir.) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,56 (1983)), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1117 (1985)), and from a portion of a Seventh Circuit judge's opinion which indicated that
the relevant inquiry was whether the defendant's conduct showed" 'malice, evil motive, reckless
behavior, or callous indifference.' "Id. at 1481 (quoting Mojica v. Gannett Co., 986 F.2d 1158,
1161 (7th Cir.) (Cummings, J., dissenting from per curiam decision to rehear en banc) (internal
quotations omitted), affd in part, rev'd in part, 7 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1643 (1994)). At the end of this recitation, the court repeated that there was
no evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant acted in reckless or callous disregard
or indifference to the rights of the plaintiff. Id. The court also determined that the punitive
damages provision of the 1991 Act should not be retroactive in the instant case. See id. at 148283; supra note 164 (discussing retroactivity of § 1981 as amended by 1991 Act). See generally
McGinley & Stempel, supra note 5, at 212 n.126.
193. Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823, 830 n.9 (4th Cir. 1994).
194. See, e.g., Mojica v. Gannett Co., 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1107, 1108-09 (N.D.
I11.1991) (stating that there was no evidence of malice or evidence of reckless behavior but
failing to discuss what these terms mean), affid in part,rev'd in part, 7 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir.
1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1643 (1994).
195. 809 F. Supp. 771 (D. Nev. 1992).
196. See id. at 780.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of
punitive damages because the "[p]laintiffs allegation of outrageous
conduct on the part of [the] [d]efendants does not provide sufficient
facts to find maliciousness or reckless indifference. Without evidence
that [the] [d]efendants acted maliciously, with an intent to harm, or
recklessly, with serious disregard for the consequences of their actions,
[the] [p]laintiff s claim for punitive damages fails."'"
Similarly, in Mojica v. Gannett Co.,2 ' the district court noted that
the evidence supported the jury's verdict that the defendant, owner of
a radio station, discriminated against the plaintiff"° ' and that the jury's
award of compensatory damages was reasonable."' With regard to
punitive damages, however, the court granted the defendant's motion for
J.N.O.V., holding: "[T]he defendant's conduct would have to show
'malice,' 'evil motive,' 'reckless' behavior, or 'callous indifference,' "
and that "[u]ndisputed evidence" negated such.2 3 The evidence
consisted of the fact that the station manager remained friends with the
plaintiff, that the plaintiff had attended the station manager's wedding,
and that the station manager had interceded on the plaintiffs behalf on
two occasions.2" Nevertheless, the court's basis for determining
whether the jury could have found discrimination was the plaintiffs
testimony that the station manager had told her that her failure to
receive pay increases and favorable shift assignments was due to the fact
that "she
was [a] Hispanic working for a black-oriented radio
205
station."
199. Id. at 781. The court recounted that about six incidents of arguably abusive conduct
occurred, the most severe of which involved plaintiff's supervisor "leaning or rubbing himself
against" her. Id. at 776.
200. 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1107 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,7
F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1643 (1994).
201. Id. at 1107.
202. Id. at 1108.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1108-09.
205. Id. at 1108. One other court at least had an opportunity to analyze the facts with
reference to the underlying basis for punitive damages but did not do so. The district court, in
entering judgment on the jury's verdict, said that the jury could have found that the defendant's
conduct was outrageous. United States EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571,
579 (N.D. I11.1993), affd in part,rev'd in part,55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995). The court found
support in the fact that the defendants abruptly discharged the plaintiff in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.), forcing him to find other
employment for the final months of his life, despite the fact that evidence showed he could
perform his job on the date he was fired. AIC Sec. hvestigations, 823 F. Supp. at 578. Further,
the jury could have properly found that the defendants had no remorse and were unlikely to act
differently in the future. Id. The court said that the jury could have properly concluded that the
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Under any reasoned interpretation of the standard, punitive damages
were appropriate in all of the cases discussed above, and the courts were
simply wrong in their recitation and/or application of the law. Part of
the problem is that the courts have carried over the problems they have
in interpreting the availability of punitive damages under Title VII's
most related predecessor, section 1981 into the Title VII area.2t 6 As
discussed earlier, punitive damages under Title VII and section 1981
should be determined under the same standard.2 " 7 Furthermore, the
statutory words which trigger an award of punitive damages under Title

discharge of "such a fiercely loyal employee reflected a reckless indifference to his rights and
a callous insensitivity to his human condition." Id. The court was aware that the purpose of
punitive damages is to deter and punish, see id. at 579, but did not analyze the facts with
reference to the purpose of punitive damages. The issue of imposition of punitive damages was
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. AIC Sec. Investigations, 1995 WL 309832 at *11.
206. At least one court has decided that the standard under Title VII is lower than the
standard under § 1981. Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 324 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
The court indicated that the proof for punitive damages under Title VII only requires a
preponderance of the evidence, id. at 324 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
253 (1989)), as opposed to § 1981, which requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
at 324 n.24. The court correctly noted that,
There appears to be no distinction between the standard for establishing a right
to punitive damages and the standard for establishing liability for disparate
treatment.... [I]f a plaintiff were able to establish the intentional discriminatory
conduct required to prove disparate treatment, s/he would by definition have
satisfied the requirement of showing the "reckless indifference" required for an
award of punitive damages.
Id. at 324. The court then noted that the Supreme Court had "equated reckless or callous
disregard with intentional discrimination and held that either was 'sufficient to trigger a jury's
consideration of the appropriateness of punitive damages.' " Id. at 325 (quoting Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983)). The court ended its discussion by stating that the Court had recognized
in Smith that the threshold for punitive damages need not be higher than that for compensatory
liability. Id.
The EEOC uses the following guidelines in deciding whether to seek punitive damages:
(1) the degree of egregiousness and nature of the conduct; (2) the nature, extent
and severity of the harm; (3) the duration of the conduct; (4) the existence and
frequency of past discriminatory conduct; (5) whether the employer attempted to
conceal discriminatory practices; (6) the employer's actions after informed of
discrimination; and (7) whether the employer made threats or engaged in deliberate
retaliatory action.
Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION, 1993, at 143, 149 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5164, 1993).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24.

-
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VII are close to the standard used for section 1981 cases, so it is both
logical and desirable for the standards to have a common
interpretation." 8 Although neither section 1981 nor Title VII cases
serve as a useful guideline for creating a standard for punitive damages,
a workable standard can be formulated by drawing on another related
area, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
E. States of Mind Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)2 9
affords the same protection from discrimination based on age for people
forty and above that Title VII provides for discrimination based on race,
sex, religion, color, and national origin."' The prohibitions of age
discrimination mirror the prohibitions of Title VII,'" and the courts
often interpret the ADEA and Title VII in para materia.1 2 The
remedial provisions of the ADEA are based on the Fair Labor Standards
Act,2" 3 and liquidated damages are available for willful violations.2" 4
The relief available under the ADEA is otherwise the same as that
available under Title VII before the 1991 Act: backpay and
reinstatement." 5 The 1991 Civil Rights Act did not include the ADEA
in section 1981a, ' 16 the amendment allowing compensatory and
208. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24.
209. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
210. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
211. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 n.12 (1978).
212. See, e.g., Monce v. City of San Diego, 895 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1990) (construing
complementary provisions of Title VII and ADEA consistently). But see Lorillard,434 U.S. at
584 (determining that "significant differences" in the remedial and procedural provisions of the
two laws foreclosed petitioner's argument by analogy). It should be noted that because of
changes in the law brought about by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the ADEA is probably now
governed, in aspects not pertinent to this article, by law which was superseded for Title VII but
left intact for the ADEA. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act, Title
VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L.
REV. 1093, 1103-04 (1993).
213. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). The same remedial provisions apply as well to the Equal
Pay Act, which is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1988). The Equal Pay Act prohibits sex discrimination in pay for equal work, id., and it is
another act which is related to Title VII. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S.
161, 167-68 (1981).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993). The Act did change the time limitation for
filing a charge under the ADEA to conform with Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp. V
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punitive damages. The courts are uniform in holding that liquidated
damages are the only true damages available under the ADEA.217
The Supreme Court indicated in Trans World Airlines v.
Thurston218 that liquidated damages are punitive." 9 The Court
recently has reiterated the rule that liquidated damages can be assessed
only if the employer acted willfully,"2 ' and the Court reaffirmed that
this means "the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for
the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by ...the ADEA. 22 '
This is comparable to the minimum standard for punitive damages under
Title VII, "reckless indifference to ...federally protected rights. 2

In Thurston, the Court concluded that the defendant acted reasonably
and in good faith in attempting to determine whether its policy violated
the ADEA. 223 The evidence of reasonable good faith was that the
defendant had consulted with legal counsel and negotiated with the
union.22 4 As a result, the Court reversed the award of liquidated
damages.225 It appears that the Court still adheres to its position in
Thurston, recently stating that liquidated damages should not be imposed
when "an employer incorrectly but in good faith and nonrecklessly
226
believes that the [ADEA] permits a particular age-based decision.
This comports with the solution proposed by this article for Title VII.
Now that this article has related states of mind under Title VII to states
of mind under the criminal law, the ADEA, and section 1981, the
question of formulating a standard for punitive damages under Title VII
remains.
1993); Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 35, at 917. Plaintiffs may be treated more favorably
under the ADEA because jury trials are available for any ADEA action in which legal relief is
sought and damages are not capped under the ADEA. See Lewis, supra note 22, at 18-19.
217. See Rebecca Marshall, Note, Bootstrapping a Malice Requirement into ADEA

Liquidated Damage Awards-Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical, 801 F.2d 651 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1987) (No. 86-1062), 62 WASH. L. REV. 551, 564
(1987).
218. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
219. See id. at 125.
220. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1709 (1993).
221. Id. at 1710.
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
223. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 129.
224. See id. at 129-30.
225. Id. at 130.
226. Hazen Paper, 113 S. Ct. at 1709 (citing McLaughin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S.
128, 135 n.13). Recklessness in criminal law, as we have seen, is the subjective awareness of
a high degree of risk that the criminally proscribed result will occur. See supra text
accompanying notes 106-09. One wonders if this is what the Court had in mind, or whether it
meant to impose some objective measure of the defendant's state of mind more akin to criminal
negligence, which generally measures the defendant's state of mind objectively.
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IV.

PROPOSED STANDARD FOR PuN1vE DAMAGES

UNDER TITLE VII

In developing a standard for punitive damages under Title VII, three
possible solutions present themselves. One solution is that the malice
requirement be treated as surplusage and the standard for punitive
damages be recklessness. This would mean that punitive damages would
be presumptively appropriate in all Title VII cases of intentional
discrimination. The problem with this solution is that the jury would
have to make the determination with no guidance as to when punitive
damages should be awarded. The Supreme Court did not seem to be
bothered by this possibility in Smith v. Wade, in which the Court
indicated that the standard for punitive damages does not have to be
higher in section 1983 cases than the standard for finding liability.227
In reality, however, this is not a desirable outcome. In fact, since the
Supreme Court chose that interpretation, the courts have had difficulty
applying
the standard in cases arising under section 1981 and Title
22 8
VII.

The second solution is that the courts simply interpret the
recklessness requirement as surplusage and rely instead on the popular
sense of, or one of the dictionary definitions of malice-personal ill
will. 9 In this situation the defendant who has discriminated
intentionally, but not because of personal ill will, would not be subject
to punitive damages. This is similarly unworkable, since the clear
language of the statute allows recovery of punitive damages if the
defendant was reckless. 23 Furthermore, the Court in Smith specifically
rejected this solution for section 1983,23' and courts have subsequently
applied this decision in section 1981 cases.232 To reiterate, a solution
which requires the standards for section 1981 and Title VII to be
irreconcilable is not the most desirable. 3
Since neither of the foregoing solutions is viable for the reasons set
forth, the point of this article is to offer yet another solution. This third
227. Smith, 461 U.S. at 51-56; see supra text accompanying notes 125-36.
228. See supra parts III.C.2. and III.D.
229. See Perkins, supra note 92, at 537 (popular sense); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1367 (1993) (dictionary definition). Black's Law Dictionary

defines malice in fact as ill will towards a particular person but states that malice in law is not
necessarily personal hate or ill will. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956-57 (6th ed. 1990).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
231. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 51.
232. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
233. It should be noted again, however, that since Smith, which rejected malice as a
standard, was decided before the 1991 Act, Congress could have meant for the standard to be
different.

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

solution is related somewhat to the second, but is more in the nature of
a clarification of the occasion for awarding punitive damages than an
interpretation of the words of the statute. Punitive damages should be
awarded when the defendant deserves to be punished"M and the award
would deter her and others from such conduct in the future. 5 The
defendant clearly deserves punishment in most cases of intentional
discrimination because she has done a great social and moral wrong
proscribed by federal law. If, however, she was acting reasonably and
in good faith, punitive damages should not be assessed. The most
obvious example involves the situation in which intentional
discrimination does not violate Title VII: the defendant interposing a
defense to Title VII liability, such as acting pursuant to a valid
affirmative action plan236 or a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ).237 Logic requires, then, that if the defendant believed,
incorrectly but reasonably and in good faith, that she was acting legally,
she should not be punished by an award of punitive damages, even
though her defense to liability would fail.
A further analogy to criminal law is useful here. The defense of
justification applies when the defendant is commanded or authorized by
law to do that which otherwise would be criminally proscribed. 3 For
example, the defendant is justified in killing in self-defense if he is
correct in his belief that he is about to be killed.239 Similarly, under
Title VII, the defendant acting pursuant to a valid affirmative action
plan is justified in intentionally discriminating.
If the criminal defendant reasonably believes she must kill in selfdefense, then, even if her belief is incorrect, she is excused. 2' Excuse

234. Accord Smith, 461 U.S. at 52.
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977).
236. See generally MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 313-24 (1988)
(discussion of affirmative action in context of employment discrimination prohibitions); Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding, under narrow
circumstances, a state agency's affirmative action program designed to promote a female to a
position never before held by a female).
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1988) (authorizing discrimination if based on narrow
"bona fide occupational qualification" exception).
238. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 91, at 56.
239. Id. But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 & explanatory note (1985) (indicating that the
defendant is justified even if his belief is incorrect but may be prosecuted for an offense
requiring recklessness or negligence).
240. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 91, at 56. Other authorities classify reasonable but
incorrect belief self-defense as justifiable homicide. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 21, at 457
& n.25; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 & explanatory note (1985) (indicating that the defendant's
belief need not be reasonable for the defendant's use of self-defense to be justified). Classifying
reasonable but mistaken belief self-defense as excusable, rather than justifiable, however, is
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in criminal law applies when the defendant has done a blameworthy act,
but for some reason should not be held accountable.24 The outcome
is, as with justification, that the defendant has a complete defense to the
crime.242 One who kills unnecessarily has done a blameworthy act,
however, which is the difference between justifiable and excusable
homicide.243 Because the defendant's good faith belief is reasonable,
the defendant should not be punished criminally even though her belief
that she must kill in self-defense was incorrect.
The criminal law analogy to Title VII is obviously not perfect at this
level of analysis: under the criminal law, if the defendant believes
incorrectly, but reasonably, that she must kill in self-defense, she is
excused.2" Under Title VII, the defendant's reasonable belief that the
affirmative action plan is valid is not a defense to liability for
compensatory damages and equitable relief.245 That is, a defendant
who has acted pursuant to an affirmative action plan which is not valid
has done a blameworthy act, and she will be liable under Title VII. 246
She should not be punished, however, with punitive damages. When
dealing with criminal intent and possible loss of liberty, the criminal
defendant similarly should not be punished if she has done a
blameworthy act but has acted reasonably. The civil defendant, on the
other hand, should be held accountable for a loss she caused by a
blameworthy act, even if that act was reasonable. However, she should
not be subjected to punitive damages, which are penal in nature, and
more analogous to punishment imposed by the criminal law.
This applies to a case of intentional discrimination as follows: The
helpful to this analysis.
241. Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses
and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 675-76 (1988).
242. Id. at 676-77; see LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 21, at 454-55 (justification); PERKINS
& BOYCE, supra note 91, at 1044 (excuse). Perkins and Boyce explain this as based on
reasonable mistake of fact. See id. Whether the defendant is justified or excused in killing in
self-defense often involves issues relating to the rule of retreat and whether the defendant was
at fault in bringing about the altercation; these issues are beyond the scope of this article. See
id. at 1121-37.
243. See Dressier, supra note 241, at 675-76.
244. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 91, at 56.
245. See, e.g., In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525,
1542 (11 th Cir. 1994) (striking down Birmingham's affirmative action promotion program under
Title VII law), cert. denied sub. nom Arlington v. Willes, 115 S. Ct. 1695 (1995). Cf. Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (striking down affirmative action layoff
preference program under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). But see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1988)
(providing a defense to any liability to parties who "in good faith, in conformity with, and iri
reliance on" a written EEOC opinion or interpretation, structure their employment decisions).
See generally PLAYER, supra note 236, § 5.3 1. See also infra note 248.
246. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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inquiry looks first at whether the defendant intended to treat the plaintiff
differently based, for instance, on her sex. Next, did any justification
exist? That is, for example, was sex a bona fide occupational
qualification for the job? If there was no justification, then the defendant
is guilty of intentional discrimination and should be assessed punitive
damages. If there was a justification, such as BFOQ, then the question
is, is it a valid defense? If it is, the defendant is not liable under Title
VII. If the defendant's purported justification is not valid, the defendant
is liable under Title VII. The inquiry then shifts to whether the
defendant should be assessed punitive damages. The answer to this
question should depend on whether the defendant believed reasonably
and in good faith that he had a justification. If the employer's
motivation was benign, then imposing punitive damages would not be
appropriate.
It is clear that intent to discriminate simply requires that the
defendant treat people differently because of their race, sex, religion,
color, or national origin.247 Why the employer treated the person
differently is irrelevant, unless the employer was acting pursuant to a
valid affirmative action plan, a bona fide occupational qualification or
some other defense.248 So, other than those situations, the employer's
motivation is irrelevant, although the courts frequently assume that
intent and motive are synonymous.249
In substantive criminal law, motive often is said to be irrelevant.2"
Although some motives, such as self-defense and necessity, are
defenses, good motives generally are irrelevant as long as the defendant
has the necessary criminal intent."' Professor Welch pointed out the
distinction between motive and intent in an excellent article in which he
proposed that motive, not intent, should be the basis for a finding of
intentional discrimination in disparate treatment cases. 2
247. See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text.
248. See International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199-200 (1991); Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 5253.
Among other possible statutory defenses are that the defendant acted pursuant to a bona fide
seniority system under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988), relied in good faith on a written
interpretation or decision of the EEOC under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1988), or would have
suffered undue hardship in reasonably accommodating religious practices under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j) (1988). See PLAYER, supra note 236, at 296-309.
249. See Belton, supra note 4, at 1253 n.210; Welch, supra note 84, at 763-72.
250. LAFAVE & SCoTt, supra note 21, at 227.
251. See id. at 227-29.
252. Welch, supra note 84, at 935. Professors Zimmer and Sullivan also discuss the
distinction between motive and intent in the Title VII context. See Zimmer & Sullivan, supra
note 57, at 31-34. Not only do I agree that the distinction is helpful for the purpose of liability,
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Professor Welch proposed to broaden the reach of Title VII by
redefining the threshold requirement for disparate treatment, asserting
that "[m]otive addresses the factors that lead into a decision: the reasons
upon which a decision is based, the realities that motivate the
'
decisionmaker. Intent is synonymous with purpose."253
Professor
Welch's analysis posits that motive can be conscious or unconscious,
while intent is always conscious." Professor Welch explains the
phenomenon of sex stereotyping in terms of unconscious motivation,2 55
which is a more helpful explanation than intentional discrimination. The
defendants in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,256 as Professor Welch
points out, were not acting with consciously discriminatory intent; that
is, they did not realize that they were treating the plaintiff differently
because of her sex.257 At least some of them even2 5had
a benign motive
8
and really thought they were helping the plaintiff.
I also think it is a useful distinction for the purposes of the award of punitive damages.
Additionally, I agree with Professor Welch and others who point out that requiring proof of
discriminatory intent does not cure the problem of workplace discrimination, which is a byproduct of societal discrimination, largely brought about by unconscious discrimination. See, e.g.,
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319-24 (1987); Welch, supra note 84, at 762. Professor
Oppenheimer suggests that since most discrimination is unintentional, a better theory of
discrimination would be based on negligence rather than intent. Oppenheimer, supra note 16,
at 900. This being the case, the disparate impact theory or Professor Welch's motivation theory
could more effectively eradicate societal discrimination. See generally Barbara J.Flagg, "Was
Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousnessand the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent,
91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 960-61 (1993) (proposing a reformed disparate impact rule); D. Marvin'
Jones, The Death of the Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45 VAND. L. REV. 349, 351-52
(1992) (buttressing statement that Title VII has "little, if any, significance as a means of helping
blacks" with statistics that showed that less than one percent of claims filed with the EEOC in
1990 resulted in any formal relief through the administrative process). "The broad purposes of
Title VII can be served only when all types of discrimination are addressed." Welch, supra note
84, at 751; cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured
Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 112 (1983) (arguing for a less stringent intent
standard in equal protection cases).
The disparate treatment theory has become an even more impotent tool to effect the
purposes of Title VII since the Supreme Court announced that in order to prove pretext, the
plaintiff may have to show more than simply that the employer lied. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2754-55 (1993).
253. Welch, supra note 84, at 736.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 742-43.
256. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Professor Welch actually cited the district court decision,
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 825
F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Welch, supra note 84, at 742-43.
257. Welch, supra note 84, at 742-43.
258. See Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117 (reporting stereotype-tainted comments from a
supporter of the plaintiff for the partnership position).
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In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff had presented evidence that she
was not made partner because some of the partners in the firm thought
she was too masculine." 9 These partners had described her as
"macho," said that she may have "overcompensated for being a
woman," and complained that she used "foul language," inappropriate
for a "lady."" 6 In order to improve her chances for partnership, she
was told to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
26
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" '
and to go to "charm school., 262 At least some of the partners were
unaware that characterizing the plaintiff as too aggressive and masculine
was based on impermissible sex stereotyping.263 Because the
defendants were guilty of sex stereotyping, however, the Supreme Court
ultimately characterized their conduct as intentionally discriminatory,
whether it was conscious or unconscious." 4
Does unconscious or subconscious motivation make the defendant
bad enough to punish? This is the problem for the punitive damages
analysis. The defendant obviously cannot interpose a defense under Title
VII, such as a BFOQ, if the motivation is subconscious, since a BFOQ
must be a conscious motivation to be interposed as a defense.2 65 As
discussed above, if the defendant reasonably and in good faith believes
that she is not discriminating, she would still be liable for the
discrimination, but she should not be liable for punitive damages. It
should be up to the jury to decide whether the defendant has a
reasonable basis for believing that she was not discriminating.
The issue that remains unresolved here is the meaning of reasonable
belief. Again a criminal law analogy is useful. The belief that the
criminal defendant must have to claim excusable self-defense requires
not only an honest belief, but also a belief that is based on reasonable
grounds.2 6 If a reasonable person ould not have believed that she had
to act in self-defense under the circumstances, the defendant cannot
claim self-defense, even if she was acting in subjective good faith. 67
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See id. at 1116-18.
Id. at 1116-17.
Id. at 1117.
Id.
See id. at 1119.
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51 (plurality opinion).

265. See Eileen M. Mullen, Note, Rotating JapaneseManagers in American Subsidiaries
of Japanese Firms: A Challenge for American Employment Discrimination Law. 45 STAN. L.

REV. 725, 769 (1993).
266. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 91, at 1113-14. "The question is not whether the
jury believes the force used was necessary in self-defense, but whether the defendant, acting as
a reasonable person had this belief." Id. at 1114.
267. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 2, at 35 (summarizing prevailing statutory and
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If the defendant's belief is unreasonable then she cannot be excused, but
rather she will be guilty of some lesser form of criminal homicide.2"
Honest but unreasonable belief self-defense will reduce murder to
manslaughter under the common law269 and to either manslaughter or
negligent homicide under the Model Penal Code.27 Under the criminal
law, then, the defendant who acts honestly but unreasonably is
nevertheless punished criminally. Similarly, under Title VII, punishing
with punitive damages a defendant who acts with honest but
unreasonable belief is appropriate."'
What would a jury have thought about the blatant sex stereotyping
in Price Waterhouse?272 A jury surely would not have found that the
defendant had a reasonable belief with regard to the motive for the

common law). The Model Penal Code itself adopts a contrary view, allowing the defendant the
defense of self-defense even if his belief was unreasonable, as long as it was honest. Id. at 36.
268. See PERKINS & BOYCE supra note 91, at 1115-16. Under the Model Penal Code, he
may be guilty of manslaughter if his belief was reckless. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 2,
at 36 (1985). If his belief was criminally negligent, he would be guilty of negligent homicide.
Id.
269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 2, at 35 (1985).
270. Id. at 36.
271. The Model Penal Code, by analogy, supports criminal and punitive sanctions for
unreasonable, i.e.; negligent, use of deadly force in self-defense, albeit a lesser sanction than that
for murder. Id. As for the definition of negligence:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985). See supra note 101 for the Model Penal Code's
formulation of recklessness.
I prefer the common law view of honest and reasonable belief to measure the defendant's
ability to claim a defense for Title VII punitive damages purposes. In Trans World Airlines v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), an age discrimination case, the Court indicated that an award
of liquidated damages is proper under the ADEA if the defendant's belief is reckless. See id. at
126. The Court did not define the term, but it is clear that the use of this standard in an area of
law analogous to Title VII adds yet another vague term to the possibilities.
272. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51 (plurality opinion); supra notes 256-64 and
accompanying text. On remand, the district court ruled that Hopkins was entitled to backpay
from the date she should have been made partner but reduced her award due to her failure to
mitigate damages. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1211-15 (D.D.C.), aff'd,
920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The eventual backpay award was more than $370,000. Id. at
1217. Hopkins also recovered attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $422,460.32. Id.
Furthermore, the district court ordered Price Waterhouse to admit Hopkins as a partner. Id. at
1216.
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discrimination.273 Accordingly, the defendant should not be relieved of
liability for punitive damages in a case such as Price Waterhouse.
In short, if the defendant is found to have intentionally discriminated,
then he is liable for compensatory damages. Upon this finding, liability
for punitive damages should be presumed, and the defendant should be
required to prove a subjective good faith belief based on reasonable
grounds that he was not discriminating.
Good faith has not been a defense in the context of a Title VII suit
before the 1991 Act. With the advent of punitive damages, however, it
should be, as long as the subjective belief is reasonable. This good faith
belief comports with the law in analogous areas: Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,274 the defendant must have
reasonable, good faith grounds for his belief to avoid liquidated
damages.275 Reasonableness also is the standard under section 1983 for
one claiming the defense of qualified immunity.276 In addition, under
the 1991 Act, the defendant may avoid compensatory and punitive
damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act277 if she can show
that she made a good faith effort to accommodate the plaintiffs
disability.278
This defense, however, should not be limited to situations in which
the employer has used an affirmative action plan or BFOQ, but rather
to any equivocal situation in which there is an argument that the
employer acted reasonably and in good faith.

273. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 259-62 (comments by Hopkins' co-workers
and supervisors). There may be other instances of subconscious motivation, however, that would
not seem so unreasonable to a jury, depending on its cultural norms. Unfortunately, these same
cultural norms may still be tainted with subconscious stereotyping. See supra note 252.
274. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-639 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
275. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128-30. Liquidated damages are awarded under the ADEA
only in cases of willful violations. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). A violation is willful if the
employer knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct violated the ADEA. See
Thurston, 469 U.S. at 128-29. The Court indicated that reasonable good faith is the measure for
whether the defendant acted in reckless disregard of protected rights under the ADEA. See id.
at 129.
276. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982). A public official claiming
qualified immunity must show only that she acted in an objectively reasonable manner, and not
necessarily that she also acted in subjective good faith. See id. The Court objectified the standard
to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial
claims on summary judgment." Id. at 818.
277. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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V.

CONCLUSION

Assuming the Court is not willing to re-evaluate its position in Smith,
that the standard for punitive damages need not be higher than for
liability,279 then the only viable solution is to construct an articulable
standard for awarding punitive damages which is based on the reasons
for the award: deterrence and punishment."8 Since it is possible to be
guilty of discrimination, despite a benign motive,"' the award of
punitive damages should consider the defendant's motive. One who acts
in subjective good faith based on reasonable grounds is not the kind of
person the law should punish or seek to deter. As the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit said in Wulf v. City of Wichita,22 "an award of
punitive damages requires an assessment of [the defendant's] subjective
state of mind." '83
A court which determines that the defendant intentionally
discriminated is simply wrong to find that the facts are insufficient to
support an award of punitive damages. The award of punitive damages
should be presumptively appropriate in all cases in which the defendant
intentionally discriminated. The defendant has acted "maliciously," with
"ill will," "recklessly," "purposefully," "callously," "willfully," and
"outrageously" in intentionally treating the plaintiff differently because
of her race, sex, religion, color, or national origin. Courts should not
have to find aggravating circumstances to justify an award of punitive
damages. Rather, they should have to find mitigating circumstances in
order to avoid approving an award of punitive damages. In other words,
the defendant should bear the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that
he acted reasonably and in good faith, because the defendant is in the
best position to do so.2 84

279. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 51-56.
280. See id. at 54.
281. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
282. 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989).
283. Id. at 867.
284. Once the jury is instructed on intentional discrimination, the court can ensure that the
defendant bears the burden of persuasion by instructing the jury as follows: If you find that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff in this case, you should award punitive
damages against the defendant, unless you find that the defendant acted in the good faith belief
based on reasonable grounds that he was not discriminating. Punitive damages are appropriate
when the defendant should be punished, so that he and others similarly situated will be deterred
from intentionally discriminating in the future.

